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II.-17 
SURVIVAL OF THE TRADEMARK LICENSE: 
IN RE TEMPNOLOGY AND CONTRACT 
REJECTION IN BANKRUPTCY 
Abstract: On January 12, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held, in In re Tempnology, that forcing specific performance of a trade-
mark license after a contract rejection in a bankruptcy case would be contrary to 
the plain-language of Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code and conflict with 
the goal of providing debtors with a “fresh start.” In so doing, the First Circuit 
joined the Fourth Circuit in a split with the Seventh Circuit, which has character-
ized a contract rejection as a breach in the context of non-bankruptcy law, there-
fore not extinguishing any trademark license rights. This Comment argues that 
the Seventh Circuit approach is the correct one as it takes legislative intent into 
consideration, does not impede a debtor’s ability to have a fresh start, and will 
likely not have any detrimental economic effects. 
INTRODUCTION 
Trademarks make up the largest branch of registered intellectual property, 
surpassing patents and copyrights.1 They are influential in driving technologi-
cal improvements and are often considered a corporation’s most valuable as-
set.2 Trademarks also benefit the consumer as they designate responsibility to 
owners, incentivizing them to offer consistently high quality goods to the pub-
lic.3 Trademark licensing to third parties offers trademark owners the oppor-
tunity to earn extra revenue and expand their market reach.4 In the context of a 
                                                                                                                           
 1 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT: BRANDS—
REPUTATION AND IMAGE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 9 (2013). This is due, in no small part, to the 
increased prevalence and reach of the Internet, which has placed high value and importance on brand 
recognition and reputation—two values that are protected and perpetuated through trademark registra-
tion. Id. at 10. 
 2 Scott W. Putney, Bankruptcy Code v. Lanham Act and Controlled Licensing, 80 TRADEMARK 
REP. 140, 157 (1990); see Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1267, 1274 (2004) (explaining the value of trademarks for large corporations and using the valuation 
of the Marlboro mark at $44.6 billion and the Coca-Cola mark at $43 billion as examples). 
 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:4 (5th 
ed. 2018). Trademark owners are incentivized to maintain high quality goods because of the potential 
for increased profits as a result of repeat customers willing to pay higher prices for quality assurances 
and reduced search costs. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987); Ned Snow, Free Speech and Disparaging Trademarks, 
57 B.C. L. REV. 1639, 1667–70 (2016). 
 4 Nguyen, supra note 2, at 1276–77. A trademark license grants the licensee the right to use the 
trademark, typically in a specific location where the third party operates and for particular products or 
services. Id. at 1275. 
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Chapter 11 bankruptcy, however, the fate of a trademark license can be uncer-
tain.5 
When an entity files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code (the “Code”) permits the debtor to divest itself of certain burdensome 
contracts and licenses with reduced consequences, aiding its financial recov-
ery.6 With court approval, a debtor may accept or reject any executory contract, 
which are contracts under which both parties have an outstanding obligation to 
perform.7 A debtor that rejects an executory contract is liable for damages for 
breach of that contract but is not bound by its terms.8 An exception to this rule 
is that when the debtor has licensed its intellectual property to a third party, the 
licensee has the option of retaining its right to use the license.9 Courts are split, 
however, on whether the licensee has the right to retain a trademark license, as 
trademarks are not included in the Code’s definition of intellectual property.10 
In 2018, in In re Tempnology (Tempnology III), the First Circuit joined the 
Fourth Circuit in holding that requiring specific performance of a trademark 
license would be contrary to the purpose of contract rejection in bankruptcy—
providing a fresh start for the debtor.11 The First Circuit established a bright-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See In re Tempnology, LLC (Tempnology III), 879 F.3d 389, 404 (1st Cir. 2018) (creating a 
circuit split by declining to follow the Seventh Circuit decision and holding that trademark licenses 
may be rejected until Congress decides differently); Kayvan Ghaffari, The End to an Era of Neglect: 
The Need for Effective Protection of Trademark Licenses, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2014) 
(“[T]rademarks remain in a precarious situation with no formal statutory protection and no consistent 
judicial protection.”). 
 6 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012); see NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1984) 
(detailing the consequences of rejecting an executory contract, including prioritization of creditor 
claims and continuing responsibilities of both parties). A debtor is the person or entity that files for 
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13). Section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code divides creditor claims into 
ten different categories and ranks them based on which need to be paid first. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). 
 7 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 395. Performance of an executory contract like a lease would in-
volve the lessor’s provision of the leased property and the lessee’s payment for the use of that proper-
ty. Laura B. Bartell, Revisiting Rejection: Secured Party Interests in Leases and Executory Contracts, 
103 DICK. L. REV. 497, 504–05 (1999). Contract rejection is the debtor’s (or trustee’s) ability to breach a 
contract entered into pre-bankruptcy. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Con-
tracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 230 (1989). 
 8 11 U.S.C. § 365(g); Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 392. 
 9 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1); Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 392. 
 10 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 395; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (listing trade secrets, patented 
inventions and designs, patent applications, plant varieties, and works of authorship protected under 
federal copyright law with no mention of trademarks); Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 395 (declining to 
follow the Seventh Circuit and First Circuit BAP by holding that the trademark license is terminated 
upon Licensee’s contract rejection); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 378 
(7th Cir. 2012) (interpreting the case in the context of non-bankruptcy law and holding that the license 
survives a contract rejection). 
 11 See Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 404 (favoring the Fourth Circuit’s categorical approach that 
would extinguish trademark license rights upon contract rejection); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond 
Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that licensee could seek money dam-
ages but would not be able to retain its contract rights post-rejection). Specific performance is a court-
ordered remedy that requires a party in breach to perform a contractual promise when damages would not 
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line rule that a trademark license does not survive contract rejection in Chapter 
11 bankruptcy.12 This decision created a split with the Seventh Circuit, which 
has held that specific performance of a trademark license can be compelled 
because contract rejection is synonymous with a breach of contract under the 
Code, giving rise to a damages claim but not terminating a licensee’s rights.13 
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of bankruptcy and trademark 
law, in addition to detailing the facts and history of Tempnology III.14 Part II 
examines the legal framework of trademark license survival in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, from Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. 
in the Fourth Circuit in 1985, to Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American 
Manufacturing, LLC in the Seventh Circuit in 2015, to In re Sima Internation-
al, Inc. in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut in 2018, the 
only case that has been decided since the Tempnology III decision.15 Finally, 
Part III posits that the Lubrizol approach the First Circuit adopted in Tempnol-
ogy III is problematic in many ways and concludes that the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation in Sunbeam is the correct one.16 
I. TRADEMARK, BANKRUPTCY, AND TEMPNOLOGY BASICS 
Section A of this Part discusses fundamental concepts of trademarks and 
trademark licensing.17 Section B of this Part discusses the significance of 
§ 365(n) of the Code.18 Section C of this Part examines the facts and procedur-
al history of Tempnology III, from its origins in the Bankruptcy Court to its 
current status in the Supreme Court.19 
                                                                                                                           
be adequate. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE. L.J. 271, 271–72 (1979). 
Specific performance may be awarded when damages are difficult to compute due to the uniqueness of a 
product or piece of land. Id. at 272–73. 
 12 See Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 402 (noting that the survival of a trademark license after con-
tract rejection would force the debtor to monitor the quality of goods sold through the licensee, run-
ning counter to the goal of a “fresh start” and the ability to be freed “from any continuing performance 
obligations”). 
 13 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377 (explaining that in a non-bankruptcy context, a licensor’s breach of 
contract does not affect the licensee’s ability to use the trademark). 
 14 See infra notes 17–41and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 42–66 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 67–87 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. 
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A. Trademark and Licensing Basics 
A trademark is an identifiable mark, name, or symbol that differentiates 
goods from a certain producer and indicates their origin.20 Trademark licensing 
is a common, lucrative arrangement for businesses wishing to broaden their 
market audience and diversify their revenue sources.21 Trademark owners can 
license their trademarks by contracting with a third party to use the mark in 
connection with certain goods or services, typically in exchange for royalties.22 
The owner, or licensor, continues to hold possession of the trademark, but the 
licensees retain the right to use it and affix it on their own goods.23 In the U.S. 
alone, licensing royalties paid to trademark owners generated $7.3 billion in 
revenue in 2014.24 
B. Bankruptcy and § 365(n) Basics 
Chapter 11 of the Code, commonly known as reorganization bankruptcy, 
allows businesses to maintain operations while paying off creditors.25 Chapter 
11 affords debtors a fresh start by allowing them to discharge certain unpaid 
debts, freeing them from some of their pre-bankruptcy obligations.26 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (describing a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof,” used in commerce to “identify and distinguish . . . goods . . . from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods”). 
 21 David M. Jenkins, Note, Licenses, Trademarks, and Bankruptcy, Oh My!: Trademark Licens-
ing and the Perils of Licensor Bankruptcy, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 143, 145 (1991). Licensing 
agreements continue to grow in popularity, in part because of “changes in product manufacturing, the 
internalization of trade, and the shift towards a service economy.” Irene Calboli, The Sunset of 
“Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 343 (2007). 
 22 See Jenkins, supra note 21, at 144 (giving examples of trademark licensors such as a business 
that licenses trademarks to manufacturers to supplement its own product with collateral goods); Xuan-
Thao Nguyen, Selling It First, Stealing It Later: The Trouble with Trademarks in Corporate Transac-
tions in Bankruptcy, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2008) (detailing the characteristics of a typical trade-
mark license agreement). 
 23 Nguyen, supra note 22, at 4; Jenkins, supra note 21, at 145. 
 24 INT’L LICENSING INDUS. MERCHANDISERS’ ASS’N, LIMA GLOBAL LICENSING INDUSTRY SUR-
VEY 2015 REPORT 15 (2015). 
 25 Alessandra Allegretto, Note, Overcoming Creditor Misfortune Creatively: Structured Dismis-
sals in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 36 J.L. & COM. 239, 239–41 (2018). It is called reorganization bank-
ruptcy because a debtor develops a plan to restructure their business to maintain operations but repay 
creditors in the long run. Id. at 239. Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing involves three relevant legal conse-
quences: (1) the creation of an estate comprised of all of the debtor’s property; (2) the installation of a 
fiduciary, often the existing management, to manage the estate and act as a “debtor in possession”; 
and (3) the triggering of an automatic stay to protect the debtor from collection proceedings. 
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 978–79 (2017). The combination of these three 
actions seeks to ensure that the debtor maintains business operations and accounts for creditor inter-
ests in order to maximize the outcome for all parties. Id. 
 26 DPWN Holdings (USA) Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 747 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2014); see 
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393–1424 
(1985) (examining the strengths and weaknesses of bankruptcy’s fresh start policy). 
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In 1985, the Fourth Circuit held in Lubrizol that a technology licensor 
could unilaterally reject a contract, stripping the licensees of their intellectual 
property rights through no fault of their own.27 In response to technology and 
investor community concern that, under this holding, a licensor’s bankruptcy 
could void almost any license, Congress passed the Intellectual Property Bank-
ruptcy Protection Act of 1988 (the “Act”), codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).28 
Under § 365(n), a licensee may either treat the rejection as a termination of the 
agreement or retain its rights under the agreement as they were enforced im-
mediately prior to the bankruptcy’s commencement.29 Should the licensees 
elect to retain their intellectual property license, they must continue to make 
royalty payments for as long as they continue to exercise those rights, or until 
the contract expires.30 The provision covers patents and copyrights, but Con-
gress notably excluded trademarks because it believed that the issue needed 
more extensive study.31 
C. Factual and Procedural History of In re Tempnology 
Tempnology, LLC (the “Debtor”) was a company that developed and 
manufactured athletic products and fabrics designed to stay cool during use.32 
It supported its business with a substantial portfolio of intellectual properties.33 
In 2012, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. (the “Licensee”) and Debtor executed 
a Co-Marketing and Distribution Agreement (the “Agreement”) that, among 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045, 1048 (allowing termination of licensee’s right to utilize patent-
ed technology despite the lack of independent action on their part warranting the loss). 
 28 See S. REP. NO. 100-105, 3200–02 (1988) (detailing the reasoning for the passage of § 365, 
including “certain recent court decisions interpreting that § 365 has imposed a burden on American 
technological development that was never intended”); see also Philip L. Lu, Note, Trademarked for 
Death? A Licensee’s Trademark Rights After an Executory Contract Is Rejected in Bankruptcy, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1431, 1439 (2014) (discussing the codification and significance of the Intellectual 
Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act). 
 29 James M. Wilton & Andrew G. Devore, Trademark Licensing in the Shadow of Bankruptcy, 68 
BUS. LAW. 739, 751 (2013); see 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (listing the licensee’s options should the licensor 
reject an executory contract). 
 30 Wilton & Devore, supra note 29, at 751–52. This provision represents an attempt to balance the 
needs of the debtor-licensor and the licensee, because the debtor’s ability to restart may depend on the 
income it derives from royalty payments. Id. at 771. In exchange, the debtor is liberated from any 
continuing affirmative obligations under the license, like enforcement of quality control, but is still 
bound by passive obligations such as exclusivity clauses. Lu, supra note 28, at 1440, 1456. 
 31 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (detailing the statutory definition of intellectual property); see also 
Jenkins supra note 21, at 148–49 (discussing Congress’s deliberate choice to exclude trademarks from 
§ 365(n) protection). The Senate Report acknowledged that quality control is an essential part of 
trademark license relationships and determined that the legislature’s lack of data made the bankruptcy 
courts more qualified to explore the matter. S. REP. NO. 100-105, 3204 (1988). 
 32 In re Tempnology, LLC (Tempnology I), 541 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2015). These products 
included athletic accessories such as socks, towels, and headbands. Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 392. 
 33 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 392. The portfolio consisted of “two issued patents, four pending 
patents, research studies, and a multitude of registered and pending trademarks.” Id. 
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other things, granted Licensee a limited license to use Debtor’s trademark and 
logo for the term of the Agreement.34 In 2015, after suffering multi-million 
dollar losses for two consecutive years, Debtor filed a petition for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy and exercised its § 365(a) right to reject seventeen of its contracts, 
including the Agreement with Licensee.35 Licensee objected, seeking to retain 
its trademark license and exclusive distribution rights under § 365(n).36 
In 2015, in In re Tempnology (Tempnology I), the Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of New Hampshire considered, among other things, whether Li-
censee’s election to preserve its rights under § 365(n) extended to the trade-
mark license.37 The court found that the trademark license was unprotected 
from rejection due to Congress’s decision to leave trademarks off the defini-
tional list of intellectual properties.38 Licensee appealed to the Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel for the First Circuit (the “First Circuit BAP”), arguing that when 
Congress omitted trademarks from the definition of intellectual property it in-
tended to allow courts to determine the issue on a case-by-case basis.39 The 
First Circuit BAP held that, though Licensee’s trademark license was not pro-
tected by § 365(n), it still had the right to use the license under a different sec-
                                                                                                                           
 34 Id. at 393. The license forbade Licensee from using the trademarks in a manner contrary to the 
terms of the Agreement and gave Debtor the right to monitor usage of the marks. Id. Mission’s busi-
ness involves advertising and selling “innovative sports technologies.” In re Tempnology, LLC 
(Tempnology II), 559 B.R. 809, 811 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). The agreement was for a term of two years 
with option for renewal. Tempnology I, 541 B.R. at 3. 
 35 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 393–94; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (allowing the trustee to continue 
or reject executory contracts on behalf of the debtor). With the court’s approval, § 365(a) allows a 
debtor to exercise his or her business judgment in rejecting an executory contract where the contract’s 
required performance may harm the recovering company. Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 394. In this 
case, Debtor argued that the Agreement should be rejected because the exclusive distribution rights 
granted to Licensee impeded its ability to profit from alternative marketing and distribution partner-
ships. Id. 
 36 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 394; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (limiting a debtor’s ability to termi-
nate intellectual property licenses that it has granted to third parties). 
 37 11 U.S.C § 365(n); Tempnology I, 541 B.R. at 2. Debtor conceded in a prior motion that under 
the Agreement, Licensee retained its nonexclusive, perpetual license to other, non-trademark intellec-
tual properties. Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 394. 
 38 Tempnology I, 541 B.R. at 7–8. The court applied the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterious, meaning “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of other things,” and found that Con-
gress’s omission of trademarks from the intellectual property definition implied that it had not intend-
ed for them to be regarded as analogous. Id. (citing U.S. v. Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d 63, 67–68 (1st 
Cir. 2010)). 
 39 Tempnology II, 559 B.R. at 821. 
2019] Survival of the Trademark License II.-23 
tion of the Code.40 Debtor appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit and the majority reversed the First Circuit BAP’s decision.41 
II. CHRONOLOGY AND DISCUSSION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The First Circuit’s 2018 decision in In re Tempnology (Tempnology III) 
establishes a clear rift with the Seventh Circuit as to whether trademark licen-
sees are protected in the event of a contract rejection in bankruptcy.42 The 
Third and Eighth Circuits also had the opportunity to examine the different 
approaches, but declined to address the issue because the contracts in the re-
spective cases were considered non-executory and the Code does not provide 
for non-executory contract rejection.43 
Section A of this Part details the cases leading up to Tempnology III.44 
Section B examines the Tempnology III decision itself.45 Section C discusses In 
re Sima International, Inc., the only case to examine the issue after Tempnolo-
gy III.46 
A. Pre-Tempnology III Chronology 
The two cases most clearly representing the circuit split are the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in 1985 in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Fin-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Id. at 821–23. This section is 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), which deems the effect of rejection to be a 
breach of contract. 11 U.S.C § 365(g); Tempnology II, 559 B.R. at 822–23. The First Circuit BAP 
agreed with the bankruptcy court that § 365(n) does not protect Licensee’s trademark rights, but because 
of § 365(g), Debtor’s breach of a trademark agreement in bankruptcy did not automatically terminate 
Licensee’s rights. Tempnology II, 559 B.R. at 822–23. 
 41 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 404. 
 42 Compare In re Tempnology, LLC (Tempnology III), 879 F.3d 389, 395 (1st Cir. 2018) (declin-
ing to follow the Seventh Circuit and the First Circuit BAP, holding that the trademark license does 
not survive Licensee’s contract rejection), with Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 
372, 378 (7th Cir. 2012) (interpreting the case in the context of non-bankruptcy law and holding that the 
license will survive a contract rejection). 
 43 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012) (allowing the trustee to reject executory contracts on behalf of 
the debtor); In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 751 F.3d 955, 966 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014) (declining to ad-
dress whether a trademark license survives contract rejection because of the non-executory nature of 
the agreement); In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 964 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the agreement was 
not executory, therefore it cannot be rejected). In 2010, in a concurring opinion in In re Exide Tech-
nologies, Judge Thomas Ambro commented on Congress’s legislative intent in § 365(n), stating that 
courts should not through negative inference treat a rejection of a trademark license as synonymous 
with the extinguishment of the licensee’s trademark rights. Exide, 607 F.3d at 967 (Ambro, J., concur-
ring); see also Keith Waters, Sunbeam and Its Impact on the Rejection of Trademark Licenses in 
Bankruptcy, 65 ALA. L. REV. 833, 839–40 (2013) (detailing Judge Ambro’s rationale in his concur-
rence in Exide Technologies and its significance in the context of § 365(n), positing that this concur-
rence was significant in shaping the argument for including trademarks in the definition of intellectual 
property). 
 44 See infra notes 47–55 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
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ishers, Inc., which both the bankruptcy court and the First Circuit followed in 
their decisions, and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 2012 in Sunbeam Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, which the First Circuit 
BAP followed.47 
In Lubrizol, Richmond Metal Finishers filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy pe-
tition and sought to reject a contract licensing the use of its patented metal 
coating process to Lubrizol.48 The Fourth Circuit approved the contract rejec-
tion, holding that allowing specific performance of a technology license would 
be contrary to the purpose of contract rejection in bankruptcy, so the correct 
remedy was damages.49 The court acknowledged that the decision could detri-
mentally affect a licensor’s willingness to enter into a contract with potentially 
financially unstable parties, but found that such equitable considerations were 
irrelevant in light of Congress’ decision to allow executory contract rejection.50 
In 2012, after the passage of § 365(n), the Seventh Circuit clarified in 
Sunbeam that the statute’s omission of trademarks was because of the need for 
further study of the issue and was not meant as an approval of Lubrizol.51 In 
Sunbeam, Lakewood Engineering and Manufacturing licensed its patents and 
trademarks for box fans to Chicago American Manufacturing (“CAM”), but 
later declared bankruptcy and sold its assets to Sunbeam Consumer Products, 
who rejected the existing licensing agreement.52 CAM continued to sell the 
fans post-rejection, so Sunbeam sued for infringement.53 The court held that 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 378 (holding that a license survives a contract rejection because it 
should be interpreted in the context of non-bankruptcy law); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that licensee would not be able to retain its 
contract rights post-rejection but could seek monetary damages). Congress passed § 365(n) in direct 
response to the outcry the Fourth Circuit’s 1985 Lubrizol holding created, and the Seventh Circuit, in 
2015 in Sunbeam, sought to clarify that Congress did not intend to codify Lubrizol by excluding trade-
marks from the statutory definition of intellectual property, despite the inference by a few bankruptcy 
judges. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376; Lu, supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 48 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045. Richmond Metal Finishers sought to reject the contract to sell and 
license the metal coating technology free from the limitations imposed by the existing licensing con-
tract with Lubrizol. Id. 
 49 Id. at 1048. The court in Tempnology III expanded on this idea by detailing the considerable 
costs to a debtor that arise from maintaining a trademark, including monitoring usage in order to 
maintain quality and develop goodwill. Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 402. 
 50 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
 51 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375. The court mentioned that although Congress had not prioritized 
trademark licensing as a topic of study since the passage of § 365(n), it did not change its original 
intent. Id. 
 52 Id. at 374. The original contract provided that Lakewood would be the entity taking orders 
from big retailers like Walmart, and CAM would directly ship the products to those customers. Id. 
Lakewood authorized CAM to sell the fans outside of this arrangement if they did not sell the full 
inventory amount. Id. After a court-appointed trustee made the decision to sell the business to Sun-
beam, Sunbeam rejected the licensing contract because it did not want to sell fans in competition with 
CAM or buy out its remaining inventory. Id. 
 53 Id. 
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under § 365(g), a licensor’s decision to reject a contract is a breach of the con-
tract, but does not terminate the licensee’s rights.54 The court also took note of 
uniform scholarly criticism of the Lubrizol decision.55 
B. The Tempnology III Ruling 
The First Circuit’s decision in Tempnology III effectively resurrected the 
Lubrizol reasoning that had fallen into disfavor since Sunbeam.56 The First 
Circuit adopted a bright-line rule that contract rejection terminates a licensee’s 
right to use the previously licensed trademarks.57 
The majority in Tempnology III explicitly declined to follow the Sunbeam 
approach, though Judge Juan R. Torruella tracked the Seventh Circuit decision 
closely in his dissent.58 The court reasoned that the First Circuit BAP’s ap-
proach, modeled after Sunbeam, would undercut Debtor’s ability to have a 
fresh start by forcing it to perform costly executory obligations arising from 
the continuance of the license, including quality control monitoring.59 Should a 
trademark owner fail to exercise sufficient quality control, it could become a 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See 11 U.S.C § 365(g) (characterizing debtor contract rejection as a breach of contract); Sun-
beam, 686 F.3d at 376 (explaining that in any context, including bankruptcy, a licensor’s breach of con-
tract does not affect the licensee’s ability to use the trademark). 
 55 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377; see, e.g., Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: 
Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 916–18 (1988) (determining that Lubrizol con-
fused contract rejection with an avoidance power and incorrectly allowed the executory nature of the 
contract to control the issue); John J. Fry, The Rejection of Executory Contracts Under the Intellectual 
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 621, 625–26, 640 (1989) (charac-
terizing rejection as a breach of contract and the Act as a success because it corrected the negative 
aspects of the Lubrizol decision by protecting the licensee in the event of contract rejection); Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the Treatment of Bankruptcy 
Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470–71 (1997) (stating that contract rejection should be 
analyzed in the context of non-bankruptcy law and Lubrizol was incorrect to use rejection as an avoid-
ing power). 
 56 See Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 404 (allowing a trademark license to be terminated upon a 
licensee’s contract rejection, similarly to Lubrizol); see, e.g., In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. 
766, 770–71 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (finding that the Lubrizol decision was unpersuasive and allowing 
licensees to continue using trademarks despite contract rejection). 
 57 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 404. 
 58 See id. (arguing that Sunbeam incorrectly failed to take into consideration the residual en-
forcement burdens for which debtors would be responsible should they be unable to reject a licensing 
contract). The majority criticized the dissent’s “equitable remedy” approach for giving too much def-
erence to Congress’s legislative intent when it drafted § 365(n). Id. at 403. According to Judge Torru-
ella, “the Senate Committee report explains that the purposeful omission of trademarks was not de-
signed to leave trademark licenses unprotected,” but to allow further study, and therefore the effect of 
Debtor’s contract rejection on Licensee’s trademark license should be guided by the terms of the 
Agreement and non-bankruptcy law. Id. at 405–07 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
 59 Id. at 403 (majority opinion). The court stated that Congress’s principal goal in allowing con-
tract rejection was to free debtors of seemingly onerous legal commitments that could hinder their 
ability to restart. Id. at 402. An example of such a commitment is a trademark licensor’s continuing 
obligation to monitor the quality of its trademarks, including usage by any licensees, to safeguard 
against public deception. Id.; Waters, supra note 43, at 844. 
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“naked license,” resulting in abandonment and the subsequent loss of trade-
mark rights.60 
In June 2018, Licensee filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court, posing two questions, the first being whether a debtor’s rejection 
of a license agreement extinguishes the licensee’s rights.61 On October 26, 
2018, the Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari only for the 
first question.62 
C. Post-Tempnology III 
Only the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, in 2018 in In 
re SIMA International, Inc., has examined the effects and relevance of the 
Tempnology III decision.63 In its opinion, the court detailed the history of the 
circuit split, eventually following the reasoning of Sunbeam and deciding that 
contract rejection does not revoke a licensee’s right to use a trademark li-
cense.64 The court focused on the plain language reading of the statute the 
Seventh Circuit advanced in Sunbeam, and it criticized the First Circuit for 
ignoring Congress’s intent to rebalance both licensors’ and licensees’ intellec-
tual property rights.65 Whether the Second Circuit will weigh in on the issue is 
uncertain, as neither party has filed an appeal, but the court’s firm renunciation 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Waters, supra note 43, at 844. Under the doctrine of naked licensing, if a trademark owner 
licenses a trademark but fails to enforce any sort of quality control over its use, a court may deem the 
trademark abandoned. Id. When a trademark is abandoned, the owner can no longer bring an in-
fringement action for unauthorized use. See FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 
515–16, 520 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that defendant-licensor did not maintain express or actual con-
trol over plaintiff’s quality control measures and was unreasonable in depending on them, therefore 
resulting in naked licensing and trademark abandonment). After abandonment, a mark is returned to 
the public domain where anyone can use it. Jonathan B. Schwartz, Less Is More: Why a Preponder-
ance Standard Should Be Enough for Trademark Abandonment, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1345, 1353 
(2009). 
 61 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, No. 17-
1657 (U.S. Jun. 12, 2018), 2018 WL 2967405 at *i. 
 62 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 404 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 397 (U.S. Oct. 26, 
2018). The question that the Supreme Court rejected was “Whether an exclusive right to sell certain 
products practicing a patent in a particular geographic territory is a ‘right to intellectual property’ 
within the meaning of § 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
61, at *i. 
 63 See In re SIMA, Int’l, Inc., No. 17-21761, 2018 WL 2293705, at *7–8 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 
17, 2018) (summarizing the Tempnology III holding and dissent and explicitly disagreeing with the 
majority’s statutory construction and deference to Lubrizol). 
 64 Id. at *4–8. Starting with Lubrizol and detailing all significant court decisions up to the present, 
the court acknowledged the value of reviewing the history of § 365(n) before evaluating it in the con-
text of the current case. Id. Writing for the majority, Judge James Tancredi also noted, similarly to 
Sunbeam, that the court was “not alone in concluding that [the Lubrizol] reasoning is flawed.” Id. at 4. 
 65 See id. at *7–8 (criticizing the First Circuit for ignoring Congress’s intent and resurrecting the 
Lubrizol reasoning). 
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of the reasoning in Tempnology III only serves to deepen the divide, running 
contrary to the constitutional goal of uniformity in bankruptcy law.66 
III. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S PROBLEMATIC HOLDING 
The First Circuit’s 2018 decision in In re Tempnology (Tempnology III) 
encourages the use of § 365 as an offensive rather than a defensive technique, 
gifting debtors an enviable ability to reject contracts at their discretion.67 Sec-
tion A of this Part details how Tempnology III misinterpreted legislative intent 
in the omission of trademarks in § 365(n).68 Section B of this Part explains 
why the concern expressed in Tempnology III regarding the costs of trademark 
quality control is outdated and unfounded.69 Section C of this Part discusses 
why weakened trademark protections as promoted by the decision will have 
negative economic effects.70 
A. The Misinterpretation of a Legislative Omission 
The Supreme Court has long emphasized that the plain text reading of a 
statute should control, unless such interpretation is clearly contrary to the 
drafters’ intent.71 As evidenced by the Senate Report discussing the passage of 
§ 365(n), Congress did not include trademarks in the definition of intellectual 
property because the topic required more extensive study, not because it be-
lieved that contract rejection should terminate trademark license rights.72 The 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See U.S. CONSt. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. (Congress has the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 
356, 369 (2006) (detailing the history of the Bankruptcy Clause and noting the absence of extensive 
debate over the text that demonstrated the general consensus for the necessity of a uniform bankruptcy 
system). 
 67 See In re Tempnology, LLC (Tempnology III), 879 F.3d 389, 404 (1st Cir. 2018) (declining to 
protect trademark licenses from contract rejection in bankruptcy in order to preserve a debtor’s fresh 
start opportunities); In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967–68 (Ambro, J., concurring) (describing the 
use of bankruptcy as “a sword [rather] than a shield”). Judge Ambro used the phrase “catbird seat” to 
describe the position in which debtors find themselves as a result of the Fourth Circuit’s rationale in 
its 1985 decision in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. Id. 
 68 See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
 71 See U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 
Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (“In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict 
language, controls.”); U.S. v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (citing Consumer Prod. Comm’n v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)) (“In the absence of a ‘clearly expressed legislative 
intention to the contrary,’ the language of the statute itself ‘must ordinarily be regarded as conclu-
sive’”); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (“Where . . . resolution of a question of federal 
law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then to 
the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.”). 
 72 See S. REP. NO. 100-105, supra note 31 (determining that bankruptcy courts were more quali-
fied to explore the issue). Section 365(n)’s legislative history suggests Congress recognized that the 
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Fourth Circuit’s 1985 decision in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc., the case that spurred enough concern for Congress to enact 
§ 365(n), did not involve trademarks, so it follows that trademarks were not a 
focal point of the statute.73 There is no hidden meaning behind the omission of 
trademarks from § 365(n), and the First Circuit’s dismissal of the Senate’s 
clear intentions is atypical.74 
B. Trademark Quality Control Does Not Hinder a Fresh Start 
One of the court’s main concerns in Tempnology III was that allowing li-
censees to maintain their trademark rights after contract rejection would un-
dercut the debtor’s ability to recover due to the costs associated with trademark 
quality control.75 If trademark owners cannot afford to monitor their licenses 
for quality control, they risk losing the trademark altogether.76 Courts already 
recognize the burden that licensors face in controlling the quality of their li-
censed trademarks and have minimized the level of control necessary to pre-
vent abandonment.77 The norm today is to allow many different forms of quali-
ty control, including delegating the responsibility to the licensees themselves.78 
It is unlikely that licensees, who often build their businesses around the value 
and goodwill derived from a trademark, would destroy that public trust and 
                                                                                                                           
necessity of monitoring trademark usage for quality control is a characteristic not shared by other 
forms of intellectual property, and the legislators were not comfortable burdening debtors with this 
cost. Waters, supra note 43, at 838; Ghaffari, supra note 5, at 1064–65. 
 73 See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d, 1039, 1045 (4th Cir. 
1985) (deciding on a patent, not trademark, license to utilize a “metal coating process technology”). 
 74 See U.S. v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpretation of statutes, 
the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent 
of Congress.”); Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 403 (stating that the dissent incorrectly afforded the Sen-
ate Report deference normally reserved for an actual statute); cf. Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 406 
(Torruella, J., dissenting) (questioning why Congress would have explicitly stated that further study 
was necessary in the Senate Report if it meant for Lubrizol to apply to trademarks, and noting that 
because Congress has declined to provide further guidance on the issue, the majority’s bright-line 
judicial rule infringes congressional intent). 
 75 Tempnology III, 879 F.3d at 403–04. As the court notes, trademark quality control is a neces-
sary responsibility of trademark licensing. Id. 
 76 Id.; see FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecyle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 515–16, 520 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that lack of control over a trademark may result in naked licensing and abandonment of the 
trademark); Waters, supra note 43, at 844 (discussing naked licensing and the risk that trademark 
owners may lose their trademark rights as a result of it). 
 77 Waters, supra note 43, at 844; see, e.g., Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging 
Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th. Cir. 1977) (acknowledging the significant burden that a party faces in 
establishing abandonment). 
 78 Nguyen, supra note 2, at 1312–13. A licensee typically has a higher level of expertise than a 
licensor in maintaining trademark quality standards, and delegation maximizes economic efficiency 
for both parties by disposing of the necessity for on-site licensor inspections. Laura Jelinek, Equity for 
Brand Equity: The Case for Protecting Trademark Licensees in Licensor Bankruptcies, 40 AIPLA 
Q.J. 365, 389–91 (2012). 
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risk the loss of customers by selling goods of a lesser quality.79 Because licen-
sees are incentivized to enforce the mark’s quality control for fear of losing 
their own customers, trademark owners will not be burdened by quality control 
costs, rendering the concern moot.80 
C. Weakening Trademark Protections Will Have Detrimental  
Economic Effects 
The Tempnology III decision could have detrimental economic and finan-
cial effects on licensors, current and potential licensees, and consumers.81 It is 
a basic economic principle that a potential trademark licensee is less willing to 
pay a high price for a trademark license that could be stripped during bank-
ruptcy than for one that is fully protected.82 As a result, the reduced willingness 
of licensees to pay a premium undercuts a licensor’s potential profits and jeop-
ardizes the licensing regime.83 In addition, if a licensee’s businesses are built 
around a trademark license, a contract rejection may force them to renegotiate 
terms in an unfavorable manner or lose their rights altogether.84 This risk could 
both devalue the licensor’s mark and negatively affect the licensee’s reputa-
tion.85 Not only is this detrimental to the licensee, it also harms the debtor 
whose estate would lose potential value from profits and goodwill benefits 
from the trademark, decreasing the eventual payout to creditors.86 Finally, if a 
contract rejection removes a trademark from the market, economic efficiency 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Nguyen, supra note 2, at 1313 (hypothesizing that licensees would not sell products of low 
quality if they have already invested their own time in promulgating the goodwill of the trademark); 
Jelinek, supra note 78, at 392 (claiming that if licensees lowered the quality of their products, they 
would disappoint customers who would possibly stop purchasing those products altogether). 
 80 See Jelinek, supra note 78, at 392 (stating that a licensee will likely not need any external pres-
sure to maintain the contractual quality standard of a trademark license). 
 81 See Ghaffari, supra note 5, at 1067–68 (detailing the potential consequences of contract rejec-
tion on trademark licensees and licensors, including “devaluing the mark and losing its goodwill”); 
Jelinek, supra note 78, at 397 (commenting on the issues for consumers if trademarks are removed 
from the market, including increased search costs); Nguyen, supra note 2, at 1310–11 (describing the 
issues that a licensee may face if a licensor files for bankruptcy, including being forced to unfavorably 
renegotiate terms of the license). 
82 Nicholas W. Quesenberry, Risky Business: How the Economic Impact of the Risk of Debtor Default 
Mandates Application of the Presumptive-Contract Interest Rate in the Case of a Cramdown Plan 
Against a Secured Creditor with a Lien on Personal Property in Chapter 13, 22 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
2 ART. 5 (2013) (“It is manifest that any disinterested buyer would be willing to pay less for a riskier, 
less stable income stream and more for a more stable and reliable one.”). 
 83 See id. (applying Quesenberry’s economic theory to the trademark licensing scheme means that 
a potential licensee would be less willing to invest in a trademark license that could be stripped in 
bankruptcy because it would be considered a risky and unstable income stream). 
 84 Nguyen, supra note 2, at 1310–11; Darren W. Saunders, Should the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Be 
Amended to Protect Trademark Licensees?, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 934, 940 (2004). 
 85 Nguyen, supra note 2, at 1310–11; Saunders, supra note 82. 
 86 Ghaffari, supra note 5, at 1068. 
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decreases because consumers are unable to rely on the trademark as an indica-
tion of high quality and are forced to spend time seeking a substitute.87 
CONCLUSION 
The First Circuit held in Tempnology III that contract rejection terminates 
a licensee’s right to use the previously licensed trademarks. This holding resur-
rected the reasoning in Lubrizol that had fallen into disfavor in recent years. 
The court used its own judgment in holding that the omission of trademarks 
from the definition of intellectual property was intentional, despite legislative 
history indicating otherwise. The First Circuit’s fear that imposing quality con-
trol obligations on Chapter 11 debtors will hinder their ability to recover is un-
founded, as courts have continued to relax the level of quality control neces-
sary to avoid trademark abandonment. Lastly, weakening trademark protec-
tions by terminating a license not only negatively affects the licensee, but also 
the debtor-licensor and consumers in general. The Seventh Circuit’s Sunbeam 
approach of examining the issue in the context of non-bankruptcy law and al-
lowing the licensee to continue using the trademarks after contract rejection 
more effectively maintains the integrity of trademarks and promotes economic 
efficiency for all parties involved. 
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 87 Jelinek, supra note 78, at 397. Conveniently, the economic justification for protecting trade-
mark licensees mirrors one of the foundational justifications for trademarks: reducing consumer 
search costs. Id. Search costs are reduced (and economic efficiency is increased) when consumers are 
able to buy a product without having to investigate the quality and reputation every time they wish to 
repurchase it, which forces firms to create consistent brand quality to retain customers. Landes & 
Posner, supra note 3. 
